










THE PATHOLOGICAL EXPORT BOOM 
AND THE BAZAAR EFFECT 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1708 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




THE PATHOLOGICAL EXPORT BOOM 
AND THE BAZAAR EFFECT 





Germany is the laggard of Europe, yet the country is world champion in merchandise exports. 
The paper tries to solve this theoretical and empirical puzzle by diagnosing a “pathological 
export boom” and a “bazaar effect”. Excessively high wages defended by unions and the 
welfare state against the forces of international low-wage competition destroy too big a 
fraction of the labour intensive sectors and drive too much capital and labour into the capital 
intensive export sectors, causing both unemployment and excessive value added in exports. 
Moreover, excessive wages induce too much outsourcing of upstream production activities 
which implies that export quantities grow too much in relation to value added contained in 
exports. Finally, excessive wages cause capital flight resulting in a too large current account 
surplus. 
JEL Code: E240, J650. 
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The Export Puzzle 
The German economy poses a puzzle. On the one hand, the country is vice champion in 
world exports after the US and even champion when services are disregarded and only 
commodities are considered. On the other hand it has been EU growth laggard in a 
number of recent years and “vice laggard” on average in the decade from 1995 to 2005 
after Italy. German exporting companies are doing extremely well, the country has a 
huge current account surplus and the DAX is steadily moving up to previous highs, and 
yet the economy is stagnating and the labour market is limping. Mass unemployment 
has increased along a linear trend for 35 years and is currently at a record level. The 
resulting fiscal strain has caused Germany to violate the EU Stability and Growth Pact 
for four consecutive years with a budget deficit consistently above the 3% ceiling. Even 
economists have a hard time understanding how all of this fits together.  
  Most economists and politicians argue that Germany is obviously able to realize 
gains from trade and successfully react to the forces of globalization, but needs to solve 
its internal problems. There are different opinions, however, about the nature of the 
internal problems. A majority of economists believe that the country’s labour market is 
too rigid and wages of the unskilled are too high for a sufficient number of jobs to be 
created, but do not relate this problem to international economic conditions. A minority 
of economists and a sizeable group of politicians and journalists argue that the poor 
performance of the domestic sectors results from a lack of domestic demand that could 
be overcome by Keynesian deficit spending. 
  This paper offers a different explanation. Export boom and weak domestic 
growth are not separate events, but are economically closely fitting parts of a 4 
development process which is caused by labour market rigidities. International low- 
wage competition of the Asian and ex-communist countries defines a new labour 
market equilibrium with lower wages, but unions as well as the fixed replacement 
incomes provided by the welfare state prevent domestic wages from adjusting. The 
economy reacts by moving from labour intensive to capital intensive sectors, by 
investing capital abroad and by replacing manpower by machine power. These reactions 
cause high exports, a large export surplus and mass unemployment at the same time.  
 
Reactions to Excessive Wages  
Like so many other western economies, the German economy has to struggle with 
world wide low-wage competition that has gained enormous strength during the last few 
decades. In the 1960s came the Japanese, in the 1970s and 1980s the Asian Tigers, and 
in the 1990s the ex-communist countries, from Poland to China, comprising no less than 
28% of the world’s population, and now also India is on the move with another 12%. 
While the new competition has confronted all countries of the West with serious 
adjustment problems, Germany has been affected particularly strongly because of its 
high wages.  
  During the last two decades West Germany had the highest hourly wage cost of 
industrial workers in the world, and only recently has it been surpassed by Denmark. In 
2004 West German wage costs per hour for industrial workers stood at 27.60 euros 
while the respective costs for Sweden, France, the US, Japan and Britain, to name only 
five comparable countries were 23.30, 20.70, 18.80, 17.90 and 19.90 euros respectively. 





































































            Source: Schröder (2005); WTO, dababase Laborsta; Ifo Institute calculations.  
Figure 1 
 
  The high wage costs have induced various flight reactions of German firms and 
wealth owners. Since the 1970s and 1980s, firms have been fleeing to robots. This was 
the period when workers were crowded out from their firms at an increasing speed and 
when factories became workplaces for robots instead of people. Capital deepening was 
the natural reaction of competitive firms.  
  Since the Iron Curtain has come down and the ex-communist countries have 
overcome their transformation crises, firms have also been fleeing to the Poles and the 
Chinese. The average hourly wage cost of the ten new EU accession countries is less 6 
than 4 euros or just about 13% of the west German wage cost. In China, wage costs are 
less than one euro.  
  The fierce international competition with low-wage products and low-wage 
locations has reduced the scope for profitable investment in Germany. As shown in 
Figure 2, at a value of less than 3%, Germany’s net investment share in net national 
product (NNP) was the lowest among all OECD countries in 2004. Instead of investing 
in Germany, the Germans exported capital in the amount of 4.6 percent of NNP in 2005. 
Currently, net investment abroad is 50% higher than domestic net investment. German 
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Source: OECD, database National Accounts - Volume I - Main aggregates Vol. 2005,


















  Many firms are giving up, closing down or downsizing their plants, yielding to 
their foreign competitors without a fight. Many are declaring bankruptcy. At close to 
40,000 cases per year, the number of bankruptcies was at a post-war record level in 
2005. The savings capital no longer needed by these firms is moving abroad, which 
explains a substantial part of capital exports.  
  But the majority of firms adjust and survive by replacing men by machines and 
having their products prefabricated abroad. By outsourcing and offshoring, i.e. by 
purchasing intermediate products from foreign suppliers and setting up their own 
manufacturing plants abroad, they make use of the low-wage regions that were created 8 
by the collapse of communism. The small and medium size enterprises (SME’s) are 
repeating in eastern Europe what the big companies have done in Asia since the 1980s. 
They globalise in the small. By averaging out domestic wage costs with those at 
locations in eastern Europe, they succeed in meeting the competition from Europe and 
Asia. The higher the wages, the more the weights of the average wage are shifted east, 
and this is how the companies survive.   
  According to a survey by the Cologne Institute for Business Research (IW, 
2002), close to 60 percent of the SME’s with 1000 to 5000 employees had already 
established plants outside the old EU by 2002, and, according to the direct investment 
statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), German firms had created 3.5 million 
jobs abroad, if weighted with ownership shares. Germany is the biggest direct investor 
in eastern Europe, bigger than the United States and bigger than the United Kingdom 
and France combined. Direct investment in eastern Europe has been growing extremely 
fast in recent years. By now the number of jobs that German firms have created in 
eastern Europe amounts to between 800.000 and 1 million, about equal to the total of 
jobs they created in the United States over the last few decades.  
 
The Bazaar Economy 
The customers of the German firms are often unaware of the relocation. While labour 
intensive upstream activities are shifted abroad, the downstream stages of production 
remain in Germany and are even expanded. Instead of “Made in Germany“, “Designed, 
assembled and sold in Germany” would often be a more appropriate label, and even that 
may in part be an exaggeration. Take the Porsche Cayenne as an example. That car is 
seemingly produced in Leipzig, but in truth the assembly line is located in Bratislava, 9 
Slovakia. Little more than the engine is added in Leipzig. According to a study by 
Dudenhöffer (2005), only about a third of the production value of that car is generated 
in Germany. No wonder then that Porsche has no problems with German wage costs. 
  Figure 3 reveals that the production depth of German manufacturing has 
declined very rapidly in the last three decades, more than in other countries. In fact, it 
has fallen from above the respective averages of France, Japan, the UK and the US in 
the early 1990s well below these averages since the end of the 1990s. Germany is no 
exception from the other members of the old EU. Similar trends are observable in many 
countries. However, as the figure shows, the trend is more pronounced in Germany than 
elsewhere, notwithstanding the fact that the manufacturing sectors of smaller countries 
by the very nature of being small have always had to rely more on imported 














Bazaar Effect in International Comparison
Share of own value-added in manufacturing output
%
1) Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Sweden, Spain and United Kingdom.
Sources: German Statistical Office, Special series 18, Series 1.4, OECD, STAN database for Industrial
Analysis, Deutsche Bundesbank, Ifo Institute calculations.
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  It has been suspected that the decline in production depth has no external causes 
but results primarily from shifting value added from the manufacturing to the service 
sector, for example by large scale industrial leasing arrangements. However, this 
suspicion is clearly not true. As Figure 4 reveals, intermediate products delivered from 
other domestic sectors to the manufacturing sector have increased only a little more 
since 1995 than the production value of that sector itself. The main reason why value 
added in manufacturing fell behind manufacturing output is the enormous increase of 
imported intermediate products, no less than 64% over a period of nine years in real 
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Sources: German Statistical Office; Ifo Institute calculations.
What Determines the Reduction in Manufacturing Depth?





sector in the period from 1995 to 2004 has resulted from shifting intermediary 















  Germany is gradually turning into a bazaar economy that is supplying the world 
with a broad range of products but has a growing share of the value of its goods 
produced in its east European hinterland. The average import share in German exports 
has increased from 27% in 1991 to 39% in 2002 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004, p. 4), 
and at the margin the import content of exports is already 53%. Of each additional euro 
of revenue a German exporter collects, he needs 53 cents to buy the imports necessary 
for the production of his exports (Sinn 2005, p. 112). German firms are reducing their 12 
production depth at a rapid pace. The obvious implication is that more and more goods 
are channelled through the country relative to the value added produced in exports. 
  In a sense, this development is not new. In fact, the German economy has been 
the world`s bazaar economy
1 for a long period of time. There is hardly another country 
offering the world a similarly wide range of sophisticated manufacturing products. 
German engineering and its dual education system are still the main reasons for the 
world championship in merchandise exports. Germany has 450 SMEs that are world 
leaders in their market niches, it is the country of the silent stars. Germany also is the 
country of the big industry fairs, at which everyone who wants to be someone has to 
present his products. Fifteen out of the twenty biggest trade fairs of the world, if 
measured by the  in-house exhibition space, take place in Germany. Only five take place 
outside this country.  
  What is new is that the bazaar is relocating its workbench. Before the Iron 
Curtain had come down, it was clear that the industrial goods sold over the German 
counter were produced on a workbench in the backyard. Now, with the low-wage 
production sites in the East, an increasing fraction of the work benches is moving 
abroad, while the counter remains in Germany. This does not mean that value added in 
exports is declining, as the number of counters may also be increasing. However it does 
mean that trading volumes increase faster than value added.  
  In principle, the specialisation on bazaar activities can be expected to bring 
about gains from trade for Germany. In the final stages of the production chains, in 
which Germany has specialised, not only assembly jobs are created, but primarily 
                                                           
1   The term "bazaar economy" has been introduced by Sinn (2003b); for a comprehensive description of 
Germany as a bazaar economy see Sinn (2003a, pp. 71-77). 13 
sophisticated jobs in designing, engineering, marketing and all the other services 
concerned with the distribution of products. Germany can further expand its role as the 
nerve centre of European trade, as the bridge between east and west, and can thus 
complement its traditional role as manufacturer for the world.  
  Many argue that the Germans should really feel lucky that the Poles and Chinese 
do the industrial dirty work for them and that they can employ the industrial workers 
released in the upstream stages in the downstream stages, in the service industries, in 
construction and in high-tech areas. By relocating valuable human labour to more 
sophisticated activities, which they do not want to leave to the Chinese and Poles, gains 
from trade are created for Germany. The production of the Cayenne in Bratislava is no 
problem for Germany but an advantage: Without Bratislava no Leipzig!  
 
Division of Labour à l'Allemande 
This picture is too good to be true. There is something wrong with it. How can the 
country be at the bottom of the growth league if it benefits so much from the relocation 
of jobs, and why the horror reports about the labour market that cause so much 
uneasiness throughout the country? 
  The theory of structural change is wrong. The industry workers replaced by 
Chinese and Poles are not released for more valuable jobs, but for nothing at all. The 
official statistics on the number of jobs do not show this, however, for the many “mini-
jobs”, “one-person firms”, and “one-euro jobs” for which policy has paved the way in 
recent years cloud the view of the real world. The statistics record 1.18 million 
additional jobs for the period 1995 to 2005. If part-time jobs are recalculated as full-14 
time equivalents, two half-time jobs as one full-time job, for example, the picture clears 
up.  
  It becomes evident that Germany lost 1.21 million full-time equivalent 
manufacturing jobs from 1995 to 2005, a figure that already incorporates the creation of 
additional jobs in the new downstream stages of production à la Leipzig
2. This 
corresponds to half of the picture of efficient structural change. 
 Unfortunately,  the  other half of the picture does not fit. In the remainder of the 
economy, where the high-value jobs for the released industrial workers would have to 
be created, employment did not rise during the same period of time. The number of full-
time equivalent jobs even declined a bit (150,000). Thus total German employment 
calculated in full-time equivalents fell by 1.36 million people during the past ten years.  
  The industrial workers, replaced by Chinese, Poles and all the other low-wage 
workers, did not move to higher-value jobs, where they would have earned higher 
incomes, but into leisure and the welfare state, surely also into the underground 
economy. There has been no improvement in the international division of labour as one 
would have expected on theoretical grounds. 
  Rather, German firms dismiss their workers without creating replacement jobs. 
Firms remain competitive, workers do not. Firms maintain their competitiveness for the 
very reason that they get rid of their German workers, replacing them by Romanians, 
Bulgarians, Hungarians, Chinese or robots. The ship stays afloat because it has thrown 
part of its crew overboard as ballast. This may be good for the owner of the ship and the 
                                                           
2   Ifo Institute calculations on the basis of Statistisches Bundesamt (2006) and Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- 
und Berufsforschung (2005, p. 8); data have been adjusted for varying numbers of working days.. 15 
rest of the crew that remains on board, but not for that part that, downgraded as ballast, 
sank to the bottom of the sea.  
 
Wage Convergence as Destiny 
The German public is watching all of this with bewilderment. The anger about the high 
profits of the DAX firms at the same time that there are mass dismissals, the abolition of 
banking secrecy and the demands for publication of manager salaries, the Social 
Democratic Party leader’s criticism of locust capitalism are powerless reactions to a 
development that deeply hurts the Germans’ sense of justice. One needs not be 
“equality-prone“, as a supreme court judge recently criticized the Germans, to 
understand these emotions.   
  But value judgments and ideas about morals do not lead anywhere, for they will 
not change the laws of economics that generate these developments. Among the laws of 
economics, it is primarily the law on factor price equalisation that is responsible for the 
German problems. Factor price equalisation says essentially that wages of trading 
partners at similar stages of development converge because capital movements and 
merchandise trade create in fact one single world labour market. If factor price 
equalisation is resisted, the unemployment results that is so lamented in Germany.
  Factor price equalisation is not a spontaneous event. It is a slowly but surely 
proceeding economic tendency of an iron law of economics that will take generations to 
work its way through. Even under the optimistic assumption that sigma convergence is 
2% p.a.,  corresponding to a half life of 35 years,  for closing the wage gap, hourly wage 
costs in the new EU countries will have risen from their current 13% to 50% of west 
German wage costs by 2030. If previous convergence experience in western Europe 16 
which suggests a convergence rate of about 1% is used for the forecast, 50% of west 
German wages will be reached only by about 2060 (Sinn and Ochel, 2003, p. 871; 
Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2006).. 
 Unfortunately,  wage  convergence as a rule moves in both directions. East 
European wages will rise faster than would have been the case in the absence of the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain, and German wages will rise less or even decline. 
  Germany can try to slow down factor price equalisation by increasing its 
innovation lead. After all, one can be as much more expensive as one remains better. A 
strengthening of basic research, promotion of innovation and improvement of education 
in schools and universities, these belong to the agenda of a rational policy. But the 
competitors are not stupid either, and technological knowledge that gives rise to 
productivity leads spreads quickly. Nobody can prevent inventors and entrepreneurs 
from exploiting their patents in Poland or China. There are ways to slow down factor 
price equalisation by becoming better, but they are limited. 
  If Germany tries, however, to slow down factor price equalisation by political 
power, be it the power of the unions or the power of the welfare state, mass 
unemployment will be the inevitable result.  
 
The Desperate Fight against Wage Convergence  
German workers were able to benefit greatly from the law of factor price equalisation in 
the immediate post-war period, when Germany was still prostate and was gradually 
being reintegrated into the world trading system. At that time, Germans were the low-
wage workers who competed with other countries. Competing with well fed Americans 17 
was a good thing. Capitalism was fun, and there was no reason to resist the law of factor 
price equalisation. Many were able to enjoy the economic miracle.  
  The economic miracle faded in the 1970s, when Germany had already 
converged on the Americans and when the Japanese took over Germany’s precision 
engineering and optical industries. Ill feelings spread when, in the 1980s, the many 
small Asian tigers emerged and not only killed the German textile industry but also bore 
down hard on Germany’s electronics and electrical industries. 
  Today, when Germany is dealing with factor price equalisation with the ex-
communist countries, whose people are vying with starvation wages for the 
internationally mobile capital, depression is setting in. China alone is ten times Japan. 
Germany cannot manage with the Chinese as easily as the Americans did with Germany 
at the time. Like their colleagues in other Western countries, German workers now 
belong to the losers of globalisation because wage competition is pushing their incomes 
down instead of pulling them up.   
  German policymakers resist factor price equalisation today with everything that 
is sacred to them. The unions are barricading themselves for the big defensive battle, the 
politicians are considering minimum wages, and the welfare state blocks the necessary 
downward wage adjustment with its wage replacement benefits. Because of past wages, 
the welfare state is offering comparatively high competing wages for doing nothing - 
with unemployment pay, social assistance and early retirement options. The private 
sector cannot outbid these wages because of international low-wage competition and 
does no longer want to in view of its own options in the East. Squeezed between the 
high-wage competition of the German welfare state in the labour market and the low-18 
wage competition in international product markets, German jobs are successively 
pushed out of the market system. 
  The wage blockage also blocks the new gains from trade, however, which 
Germany could extract from globalisation and a further specialisation of its production. 
Gains from trade and factor price equalisation always go hand in hand because gains 
from trade result from a country’s specialisation in certain sectors and because 
specialisation only functions if flexible labour markets allow the movement of labour 
among sectors. You cannot have one without the other. That is why, as a rule, gains 
from trade are only possible in the sense that the winners win more than the losers lose. 
The pie becomes bigger, but some get an absolutely smaller piece. It is obvious that 
society does not accept this when the number of losers becomes big and well organised 
politically. That is the core of the German dilemma. 
  Because of rigid and high wages, the labour intensive sectors lose too many jobs, 
and other sectors create too few new jobs. Unemployment continues to rise, growth 
slows down, and in view of the financial consequences the welfare state faces a crisis. 
There is no trace of new gains from trade derived from eastern enlargement or 
globalisation.  
 
Why the Export Boom does not Indicate Gains from Trade 
Some may consider this is an exaggeration. German exporting world championship 
does not fit this bleak picture! The championship proves that Germany is competitive 
and is only suffering from domestic demand problems which can be mitigated with 
Keynesian policies.  19 
  Unfortunately, this conclusion is ill founded. Firstly, because the evolution of 
the bazaar economy inflates the volume of export quantities relative to the value added 
contained in exports, secondly, because the export boom cannot be taken as an indicator 
of gains from trade, and thirdly because both of these effects are pathologically 
overdrawn. Let us look into this in detail.  
  The first effect is the bazaar effect. If a country, as Germany is doing, specialises 
in bazaar activities in the sense of downstream stages of production and lets more and 
more people work there, then with the expansion of value added in these stages it must 
import, piggyback, more and more intermediate products from abroad, which are 
immediately exported again after having being reprocessed. In 1991, 27% of German 
exports consisted of imports of intermediate goods. By 2002 this figure had risen to 
38%. And the marginal effect is even larger. Of each euro that is spent on additional 
exports, 55 cents are already used for imports of intermediate products and of 
merchandise. And one percent of additional real export-induced value added results in a 
rise of the export volume by 1.36 percent. The German economy is becoming like a 
continuous-flow water heater for manufactured goods that, on their way from Slovakia 
to America, pass through the German statistics. This does not, in itself, imply that there 
is something wrong with this development. However it is an explanation for why 
exports are so high.  
  Note that a specialisation in upstream activities would not have decoupled value 
added in exports and export quantities. With no imported intermediate products both 
variables would have grown proportionately, and if the share of imported intermediate 
goods had declined, value added would have grown faster than export quantities.  20 
  More important is the second effect. One must not ignore the fact that not only 
the export volume is rising, but so is the value added in exports themselves, i.e. what 
Germany adds before it exports its imports again, thereby creating income in Germany. 
Although the share of domestic value added per unit of exports is shrinking, the number 
of units is growing so fast that it more than offsets the bazaar effect with regard to 
aggregate value added. Value added in exports is rising more than GDP and the other 
income aggregates. An ever increasing share of income earned in Germany is generated 
by exports. 
  Many people think that this proves that Germany is managing quite well with 
globalisation and is achieving gains from trade. The number of those who think like that 
ranges from the German Council of Economic Experts to a majority of the media and 
the respective ministries of the Federal Government. 
  They are overlooking, however, that export goods are those goods in which a 
country specialises after trade is opened. By definition, specialisation means that labour 
and investment capital move into export production so that the income earned there, i.e. 
the value added, rises more than proportionally, and this holds also when the sectors in 
which a country specializes are downstream elements of the value added chain. It is true, 
therefore, for each normal country that participates in the expansion of trade that value 
added in export grows faster than average value added, that is faster than GDP. 
  Economic advantages for Germany cannot be derived from this observation for 
the simple reason that it merely describes a self-evident implication of specialisation. 
Labour and capital, which move to the export industries, originate in other sectors that 
must cut back their output and value added correspondingly. This reduction in value 
added must be subtracted before an assessment is possible. Therefore aggregate growth 21 
figures show better how a country is coping with international trade than export 
statistics. If the farmer sells more wheat because he uses less land for the production of 
rye, it does not follow either that he increases his profits by doing so. 
 
The Pathological Export Boom 
Let us now turn to the third effect. Economic advantages cannot be derived from the 
export boom because Germany has all but fled into exports because of the high-wage 
policy followed in past decades. Only at first sight does the country give the impression 
that it is coping well with globalisation. A country that fixes its wages above the 
internationally competitive level is forced to specialise excessively in capital intensive 
products at the expense of labour intensive products, because this is the only way in 
which it can survive foreign competition. This is the practical variant of a brief 
theoretical allusion made by Srinivasan (1995, p. 372) in a comment on Krugman (1995) 
and it also follows from the theory of foreign trade with fixed wages as developed by 
Brecher (1974) and Davis (1998).  
  Germany exports capital intensive goods and imports labour intensive goods. 
Capital intensive goods are those that are produced with a high input of sophisticated 
machinery and expensive plant but that require only few production workers. Examples 
are mass manufactures that are produced on automated assembly lines and require little 
labour. Human capital intensive goods that impose high demands on technological 
knowledge also can be taken to belong to this category. Let us, for the purpose of 
analysis, lump these two kinds of capital together and distinguish unskilled labour from 
them. Labour intensive goods are those for which unskilled human labour is most 22 
important. They range from textiles and clothing to personal services like haircuts or 
tourism.  
 In  principle,  German specialisation in capital intensive goods is to be expected 
from a healthy development of international trade because the country is capital rich in 
an international comparison. However, the high and increasing level of German 
unemployment shows that wages are above their market clearing level. With regard to 
the international division of labour this has had very unfavourable consequences. The 
high German wages have destroyed labour intensive production beyond a healthy extent 
and have forced the country to satisfy its needs by growing imports. Too much labour 
and capital were released by the labour intensive branches of industry. Financial capital 
set free be depreciation moved to other sectors and the increments of the economy’s 
capital stock financed from savings did so, too. Land and real estate in general was used 
in other sectors and the skilled children of those people that used to be employed in the 
labour intensive sectors of the economy chose different occupations enabling them to 
work in the capital intensive high-tech areas of the economy. With them, of course, the 
unskilled moved to sectors where they could find jobs. The released factors of 
production pushed into the capital intensive export sectors that were still best able to 
deal with the high wages (for unskilled labour). These sectors expanded beyond their 
efficient size providing the goods necessary to purchase imports. That is why export-
induced value added is booming in Germany.  
  But the boom has pathological characteristics because the capital intensive 
sectors were able to absorb the capital but not the many unskilled who were dismissed 
by the labour intensive sectors. Unemployment has been rising, and as the jobless do 
not create value, growth has slowed down. 23 
  Possibly, the extension of trade will not even bring about additional gains from 
trade for Germany. This must be feared if wage stickiness leads to such an excessive 
expansion of trade that Germany’s terms of trade cannot improve. Gains from trade will 
rise only if the terms of trade move further away from their autarky values. When there 
are no changes in the terms of trade while unemployment rises, additional gains from 
trade are impossible because the economy operates below its production possibility 
frontier.  
  With competitive wage determination, which would have resulted in lower 
wages, things would have been different. With lower wages, large parts of labour 
intensive industries would have survived, and at the same time, all industries would 
have been induced to choose less capital intensive production processes, i.e. would have 
employed more people instead of machines. Unemployment would have been avoided 
for both of these reasons.  
  The most important aspect of an efficient market reaction with declining wages 
would be the larger survival rate among the labour intensive industries. It implies that 
less capital would have been sent to the capital intensive export sectors, and with it also 
less labour would have had to move to that sector. Value added in the export sector 
would have been smaller, but value added in the labour intensive sectors would have 
been larger. In fact, even aggregate value added would have been higher as less labour 
would have remained idle. Measured against the yardstick of a competitive economy, 
the size of the export sector in the German case of fixed wages that are above the 
market clearing level is excessive. Germany is experiencing a pathological export boom.  
  Among the labour intensive industries that have been replaced by imports in 
Germany are textiles, leather as well as precision instruments. They no longer play an 24 
important role as employers. Above all, however, home and restaurant services have 
been lost that used to employ a substantial number of Germans. 
 Former  president  Roman Herzog thought that Germans are not producing 
services because they do not like to serve. But there has not always been a lack of 
willingness. That it is lacking today is the result of the high-wage policy of the unions 
and the wage competition of the welfare state. Germans have become too expensive to 
be willing to purchase services from one another. 
  They switch instead to purchases of manufactured goods and foreign services. 
The cleaning lady is a self-employed worker from Poland, and leisure is sought in 
Mallorca. In the midst of its economic lull, in 2004, Germany became world 
merchandise exporting champion and world tourism importing champion at the same 
time. 
 
Why the Bazaar Effect is Overdrawn 
In the model of Brecher and Davis, which basically is a mutant of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, the economic sectors among which excessive factor movements take place, are 
vertically integrated production chains like those defined in national accounting systems. 
However, today, capital movements also occur between sectors defined as stages in 
vertical production chains. Downstream activities are generally more capital intensive 
than upstream activities where manual labour still plays an important role.  
  For one thing, downstream activities typically involve much inventory capital 
per worker because intermediate products are used that have already passed many 
production steps and are accordingly expensive. This is the basic view of Böhm-
Bawerk’s (1889) temporal theory of production, the predecessor of neoclassical capital 25 













theory. Capital is basically inventory capital, and the more of this capital is used per unit 
of labour, the bigger the number of production steps the inventories have passed already.  
  Secondly, downstream activities often require much human capital in terms of 
design, marketing and engineering skills, because the final products are developed and 
customised in downstream facilities and the upstream activities have to subject 















  Figure 5 explains the direction of specialisation in a simplified model with two 
vertical production lines, each of which consists of two stages of production. The 
normal specialisation effect is horizontal and goes from labour intensive to capital 
intensive production lines. The bazaar effect is vertical and goes from upstream to 26 
downstream activities because the latter are the more capital intensive ones. As a result 
of both specialisation effects, economic activities are concentrated in the downstream 
sectors of the capital intensive production lines.  
  In principle, both the horizontal specialisation and the bazaar effect are efficient 
reactions to the new trade relationships with labour abundant countries. However, as 
explained above, high and rigid German wages that have failed to react to the forces of 
globalisation and international low-wage competition have induced excessive factor 
movements that go beyond the social optimum and induce unemployment. In particular, 
high and rigid German wages have induced excessive factor movements from upstream 
to downstream activities. The Brecher-Davis-Srinivasan effect has artificially reinforced 
the bazaar effect expanding even further the volume of German exports beyond the 
export-induced value added. The above mentioned elasticity of the export volume with 
respect to the export-induced value added of 1.36 is partly the result of this distortion. It 
is true that the efficient level of this elasticity would also have been above unity due to 
the normal specialisation effect, but the bazaar effect would have been weaker and the 
numerical value of the elasticity would have been smaller had wages adjusted so as to 
avoid unemployment.  
  To summarize, there have been two pathological forces in German trade. For 
one thing, value added in exports grew too quickly, and for another the bazaar effect 
was too strong which meant that export quantities grew too quickly relative to export 
value added. Both effects together resulted in excessive export growth. The export 
boom combined with increasing unemployment and stagnation in the rest of the 
economy are the normal symptoms of a high-wage country that is unable to exploit 
globalisation to its own advantage. That is the sad solution of the German puzzle.  27 
 
But the Trade Surplus! 
Some readers  may still refuse to accept this explanation by pointing to the German 
trade surplus. As exports are still rising even if offset by imports, Germany appears to 
be a winner of globalisation at this very time. But this mercantilist view is clearly not 
correct.  
  A country can only give away or lend its export surplus. The foreign exchange 
that it earns but does not spend on imports, is partly given away as foreign aid, EU 
contributions or other unilateral transfers. The majority is invested abroad. Net exports 
are identical to net capital outflows. 
  One of Germany’s problems is that its investors are no longer willing to use the 
growing domestic savings to finance domestic investment projects. The surplus of 
savings over investment is exported to other countries via the international capital 
markets. At the same time, the surplus of savings over investment is the surplus of the 
not consumed part of national output over investment that is moving abroad. Capital 
flight needs an export surplus to take place. If only for this reason, the export surplus 
cannot be interpreted as gains from trade.  
  Figure 6 shows how large the German export surplus in terms of the current 
account surplus (exports – imports – net transfers to other countries) has recently 
become. The figure suggests that the increase of the surplus can partly be attributed to 
the investment strike that was mentioned above (see Figure 2).  
  In fact, the current account surplus completes the pathological export boom as 
described above. The huge and artificially maintained gap between German and foreign 
wages for simple labour has pushed out more of the existing and potential capital from 28 
the labour intensive sectors of the economy than was efficient. Some of this capital 
moved to the capital intensive sectors of the economy, some fled abroad. Record levels 
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  An export of capital is not, of course, in itself a source of welfare losses. It could 
be part of an intertemporal exchange of resources that increases the welfare of all 
participating countries. However, to the extent the capital flight is induced by wages 
that are fixed above the market clearing level, such a favourable interpretation is not 
possible. As the technological factor input ratios are given in this case, a net capital 29 
export is a measure of the relocation of jobs abroad. The savings which are not invested 
in Germany are lost to the domestic labour market. 
  This pessimistic view may be countered by pointing to Germany’s favourable 
direct investment statistics. Recently, foreign companies have invested more in 
Germany than Germans have invested abroad. Does this not prove that Germany is 
importing capital despite the positive trade surplus? It does not. For one thing, direct 
investment is extremely volatile. One year the net flows go in this direction, next year it 
can be the other way round. For another, direct investment is only a small part of 
international capital flows. Net capital outflows, measured as the difference between 
exports and imports, already contain net direct investment abroad. Financial capital 
moving via the banks accounts for the lion’s share of international capital flows.  
  Incidentally, direct investment does not measure what is commonly thought. In 
part, it includes the purchase of existing firms, for example the sale of the German 
pharmaceutical industry to the French. Above all, it includes the retained earnings of 
foreign firms located in Germany, for whatever purpose the retentions are made. If IBM 
Germany does not send its profits to headquarters, but invests them in the international 
capital market and in this way finances bank loans for a factory in Finland, this is 
counted as direct investment in Germany.  
 
What Is there to Do?  
In this historical phase, Germany cannot use the forces of globalisation to generate 
additional gains from trade because it holds on to wage structures that go back to the 
time before the ex-communist countries participated in international trade. Germany 30 
cannot continue with this strategy for any length of time because it leads to mass 
unemployment and chaos. What are the consequences for politics? 
  It would be fatal it politicians would conclude that they must weaken the forces 
of globalisation by new trade protectionism in order to reduce the pressure on German 
wages in this way. New protectionism would also put the past gains from trade at risk to 
which Germany essentially owes its prosperity to this very day. One cannot warn 
enough against this strategy. Those who demand tariffs and claim that this is not 
protectionism, do not know what they are talking about.   
  It would be just as fatal if the politicians were to introduce minimum wages. A 
policy of expanding the foreign posting law and declaring union wages as generally 
binding would prevent gains from trade, increase unemployment and prolong the ailing 
of the German economy. It would further accelerate the march along the wrong road 
that Germany has travelled for decades and that has led to the economic problems of the 
country. 
  Correct would be the promotion of education in order to improve the quality of 
the work force. But this will only help in the long term. 
The only policy reaction that promises success in the medium term is making the 
labour markets more flexible combined with a policy of compensating the losers of the 
required wage adjustments. There is simply no alternative. 
  The unskilled, who lose the most, should be compensated with personal wage 
subsidies. The Ifo model of activating social assistance, which was recommended by the 
German President and which would replace state wage replacement benefits (and 
therefore would not cost any additional money), points to the right way.   31 
  In addition, all employees should be able to participate in the gains from trade 
and redistribution accruing to the firms that result from factor price equalisation. The 
models of employee participation in their firms are well developed and functioning. The 
bargaining parties should increasingly agree savings wages instead of cash wages. If, at 
the same time, the already employed workers are distinguished from newly hired 
workers in this, the distribution conflict caused by globalisation will be defused and 
employment will be raised. 
  Germany can achieve its distribution goals only with and never against the laws 
of the market. Political power cannot cancel economic laws, especially not the law of 
factor price equalisation. If the Germans were to think a bit more Marxist in this respect, 
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